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The Application of Antitrust Logic to Military Procurement
Policies Would Enhance America's National Security
Amit Bindra*
1. CONGRESS PASSED LEGISLATION DECREASING COMPETITION
WHEN THE MILITARY PURCHASES GOODS
The United States military procurement process is a rigged game.
The Defense Department gives preferential treatment to American
companies at the expense of foreign firms and foreign innovation.'
The military attempts to promote small businesses over larger corpo-
rations, which has the potential to increase production costs. 2 Instead
of purchasing products separately, different military branches now
purchase products together as a singular unit.3 This new process has
contributed to a deceased level of product quality.4 The Defense De-
partment can additionally restrict research dissemination and prevent
private sector companies from either accessing certain research or us-
ing it for non-military purposes.5 These policies can result in de-
creased competition in the military procurement market.
Society benefits when firms attempt to maximize competition: com-
peting firms attempt to decrease their costs and innovate their prod-
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1. Dean E. Brunk, Government Procurement: "FAR" from a Competitive Process, in ADVANC-
ING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: PRACTICES, EXPERIENCES, INNOVATION, AND KNOWLEDGE SHAR-
ING 156, 160 (Khi V. Thai & Gustavo Piga eds., 2006), available at http://www.ippa.org/ippc2-
book.html.
2. Id. at 160-61.
3. HARVEY M. SAPOLSKY, EUGENE GHOLZ & CAITLIN TALMADGE, U.S. DEFENSE POLITICS:
THE ORIGINS OF SECURITY POLICY, 76-77 (2009).
4. Id. at 61-95.
5. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Nanotechnology and Regulatory Policy: Three Futures, 17 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 179, 193-97 (2003).
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ucts to attract more consumers.6 Without competition, firms produce
goods inefficiently and without increasing the quality of those prod-
ucts.7 Consumers lose in this environment as costs increase but the
product quality decreases. A society can maximize aggregate wealth
when the greatest number of buyers can acquire the products they
desire just slightly above the price it costs firms to produce those
goods.8 Antitrust laws thus function as a way to protect the public by
maximizing competition. 9
Americans are the ultimate losers as a result of the Defense Depart-
ment's policies. Citizens pay the price as inefficient production means
an increase in costs, and thus higher taxes. These military policies can
also make Americans unsafe because a decrease in product and
weapon quality negatively impacts U.S. national security. American
military strength depends on its technological advantage over other
nations, and product innovation plays a critical role in military
strength.' 0 Product innovation also suffers when the military branches
purchase products together, instead of the branches purchasing those
products separately." By limiting the pool of military suppliers to
American companies' 2 and by preferring small businesses,' 3 the De-
fense Department again limits product innovation. When the military
prevents private sector companies from accessing innovative research
and information, the military potentially deprives consumers of criti-
cal new products. Competition can advance U.S. national security by
increasing weapon quality while decreasing the costs. Due to these
factors, Congress should repeal military procurement policies because
the laws are inefficient.
6. ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN
PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 30 (2d ed. 2008).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. GAVIL, KoVACIC & BAKER, supra note 6, at 64 (citing 21 CONG. REC. 2456-57 (1890)
(statement of Sen. Sherman) ("If we will not endure a king as a political power, we should not
endure a king over the production, transportation, and sale of any of the necessaries of life. If
we would not submit to an emperor we should not submit to an autocrat of trade.")). See also
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 1 (2005) ("Few people dispute that anti-
trust's core mission is protecting consumers' right to the low prices, innovation, and diverse
production that competition promises."). Professor Hovenkamp also states, "The antitrust laws
are concerned with maintaining competition in private markets. 'Competition' refers to a state
of affairs in which prices are sufficient to cover a firm's cost, but not excessively higher, and firms
are given the correct sent of incentives to innovate." Id. at 13.
10. Zalmay Khalilzad, Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold
War, 18 WASH. Q. 87 (1995).
11. SAPOLSKY, GHOLZ & TALMADGE, supra note 3 at 76-77.
12. Brunk, supra note 1, at 160.
13. Id.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Price Competition Improves Society's Aggregate Wealth
It is important to understand the economic rationale behind U.S.
antitrust laws. The laws have both economic and non-economic
goals.14 The primary economic goal of antitrust law is to prevent firms
from exercising "market power" or restricting output.'5 A seller exer-
cises "market power" when the seller reduces output or limits compe-
tition to raise price above the competitive level.16 A decrease in
competition ultimately hurts society: it transfers resources from buy-
ers to sellers.17 Competition between firms has three advantages for
society and consumers: (1) the most efficient firm will produce the
goods or services at the lowest cost; (2) the consumer that values the
good the most will acquire it; and (3) competition between firms in-
creases the quality of goods as firms competing for profits have a
greater incentive to innovate their products.' 8
Sellers attempt to achieve profit maximization in three ways: (1)
finding ways to decrease the costs of production so that the firm can
lower the price of the goods; (2) differentiating the product from
available substitutes;19 and (3) exercising market power and raising
prices above the competitive level. 20 When sellers increase the price
of their products, they sell fewer goods because buyers find less ex-
pensive substitutes; however, some buyers will continue to purchase
the product at the same price.21 When the price decreases, new buy-
ers will begin to acquire the good sold at the lower price.22 In a per-
fectly competitive market, a firm will produce an additional product
so that the market price equals the cost of producing that additional
unit; or the "marginal cost." 23 No firm will have the ability to raise
price by reducing output in a perfectly competitive market.24 When
sellers can reduce marginal cost, it benefits both buyers and sellers.
Sellers can produce more goods at a lower price, which allows more
buyers to acquire goods they desire.
14. GAVIL, KoVACIC & BAKER, supra note 6, at 16. See also HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, at
15-20, 95-96 (providing a detailed economic explanation).
15. GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 6, at 17; HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, at 13-15.
16. GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 6, at 17.
17. Id. at 29.
18. Id. at 29-30. See also HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, at 25-30.
19. GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 6, at 30.
20. Id. at 26.
21. Id. at 18.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 21.
24. GAVIL, KOVACIc & BAKER, supra note 6, at 31.
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The coffee industry serves as an illustrative example to explain
these economic concepts. 25 One hundred buyers will purchase coffee
priced at $1.00, fifty buyers will purchase coffee priced at $1.50, and
one hundred and fifty buyers will purchase coffee priced at $0.50. The
shop maximizes profit by selling its coffee to one hundred buyers at
$1.00; the seller would make $100 at that price and $75 at the other
two prices. To increase profits, the shop might attempt to decrease its
marginal costs so that it can lower the price of its coffee to attract
more consumers; for example, the firm might purchase less expensive
coffee beans. The seller could also find a way to differentiate its prod-
uct; it could try to produce coffee that tastes better or produce coffee
that has a higher concentration of caffeine. In these situations, the
consumer benefits as the coffee costs less, the coffee tastes better, or it
has more caffeine.
The exercise of market power can have severe consequences for
consumers. 26 If a seller has market power, it has the ability to raise
the price of the product and has a disincentive to innovate its produc-
tion. When buyers do not have attractive substitutes, a seller with
market power can raise prices without losing profits; or at least until
buyers find an imperfect substitute. If there is only one coffee shop in
an area heavily concentrated with consumers, that coffee shop can
raise prices above the competitive level or its marginal costs. While
some buyers will find alternative products, the firm will still increase
profits. Of the one hundred buyers who purchased coffee at the mar-
ginal cost level of $1.00, ninety buyers might purchase coffee at $1.50,
increasing overall profits for the firm. Ten individuals might stop
drinking coffee or bring a beverage from home, but the majority of
the people will continue to go to the coffee shop.
Buyers can also attempt to dictate the economic relationship with
sellers to achieve advantages.27 In a monopsony, a single buyer
purchases goods and services from multiple sellers. The coffee shop
again helps to explain monopsony power. If there is only one domi-
nate coffee corporation, it could attempt to negotiate favorable terms
when purchasing coffee beans from suppliers. The corporation could
negotiate lower than competitive prices because no other buyers could
attempt to purchase coffee beans. While the corporation would have
lower costs, it could still maintain the same price of coffee for its buy-
ers. Even if the corporation did decrease its prices, the suppliers
25. See id. at 17-32 (explaining the example of a coffee shop in much further detail).
26. Id. at 27-29.
27. See generally RODGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPsoNY: ANTrrRUST LAW
AND ECONOMIcs 36-42 (1993) (explaining monopsony power using a textile mill as an example).
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would still suffer an economic loss. The corporation could also dictate
the types of products it wants. For example, if the corporation only
wants generic coffee beans, the suppliers have a disincentive to create
new products.
The last two scenarios represent an allocative loss for society and
consumers: fewer buyers are acquiring goods they desire and compa-
nies are not improving product quality.28 Society maximizes aggre-
gate wealth when the greatest amount of buyers purchase goods they
desire at the lowest price.29 Maximizing aggregate wealth most likely
occurs when firms compete amongst one another, decreasing costs
and increasing quality.30 Ultimately, society benefits the most from
perfect competition.3 1
The U.S. has often used antitrust laws to promote non-economic
goals as well: fairness, social justice, equity, political stability, and the
protection of small businesses. 32 These issues are concerned more
with subjective values than with the economic well-being of the con-
sumer.33 Larger firms might produce at a more efficient rate than
smaller firms, so consumers might benefit if larger firms eliminated
smaller firms.34 Smaller firms, however, might produce additional
benefits even if the firms do not maximize production efficiency.35
Smaller firms could result in the increase in "quality of life" through
local ownership. 36 They might increase aggregate employment, which
might outweigh the harm from the firms' inefficient production.37
Some individuals additionally fear that highly concentrated wealth be-
28. GAVIL, KoVACIC & BAKER, supra note 6, at 32.
29. Id. at 32.
30. Id. at 29-32.
31. Id.
32. Id. See generally Warren S. Grimes, Brand Marketing, Intrabrand Competition, and the
Multibrand Retailer: The Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 83 (1995); Louis
B. Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076
(1979).
33. GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 6, at 32.
34. Id.
35. Id. See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 ("[W]e cannot fail to
recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, lo-
cally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might re-
sult from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these competing
considerations in favor of decentralization."); Brian G. Smith, Size Standards and Contract Bun-
dling in the Federal Marketplace: An Uphill Battle for Small Business Owners, 1 OHIo ST. EN-
TREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 175, 176 (2006).
36. GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 6, at 32. See also Bernard W. Bell, Legislatively
Revising Kelo v. City of New London: Eminent Domain, Federalism, and Congressional Powers,
32 J. LEGIs. 165, 203-04 (2006).
37. GAVIL, KOVACIc & BAKER, supra note 6, at 32.
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tween a few big firms could also lead to the corruption of the political
process.38
B. An Explanation of the Sherman Antitrust Act
1. The Sherman Antitrust Act Attempts to Maximize Competition
The Sherman Antitrust Act primarily focuses on the number of
buyers and the conditions of entry: markets do not work competitively
without these factors.39 State legislatures, however, have immunity
from antitrust liability as Congress's intent was not to prevent states
from exercising their police powers.40 The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that competitive markets produce a variety of economic bene-
fits: "The assumption that competition is the best method of allocating
resources in a free market recognizes that all elements of a bargain -
quality, service, safety and durability - and not just the immediate
cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among
alternative offers."41
Section 1 of the Act indicates "[elvery contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade" to be
unlawful both civilly and criminally.42 Thus, there are two elements
under Act: (1) concerted action and (2) an anticompetitive effect.43
Section 2 of the Act attempts to prevent the monopolization of the
market.44 It indicates that there are three violations: (1) monopoliza-
tion; (2) attempted monopolization, and (3) conspiracy to monopo-
lize. 4 5 The Supreme Court has indicated there are two elements to
monopolization: "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the rele-
vant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence
of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." 46 The
Court has indicated that for attempted monopolization, the plaintiff
must prove "(1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or an-
ticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3)
38. Id.
39. Id. at 40. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, at 20-25 (explaining briefly the impor-
tant antitrust statutes and sections).
40. See Mark L. Leib, White Coats and Union Labels: Physicians and Collective Bargaining, 42
ARIz. L. REV. 803, 813 (2000).
41. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
43. GAVIL, KoVACIC & BAKER, supra note 6, at 89.
44. Id. at 582.
45. Id.
46. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
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a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power." 4 7 Conspira-
cies to monopolize require a concerted action with a specific intent to
monopolize, but the plaintiff does not have to prove that the defen-
dant had monopoly power.48
2. Courts Primarily Use Two Tests to Apply the
Sherman Antitrust Act
For the most part, courts apply two different tests to determine the
existence of an antitrust violation: per se or rule of reason. 4 9 In Ad-
dyston Pipe, Justice Taft carved out a per se rule when the object of a
contract is to limit competition: "it would seem that there was nothing
to justify or excuse the restraint, that it would necessarily have a ten-
dency to monopoly, and therefore would be void."50 Per se violations
are "conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or
to the business excuse for their use."5' Courts consistently find that
group boycotts5 2 and horizontal agreements to fix prices53 are per se
violations of the Act. For the courts to presume that particular con-
duct had an unreasonable anticompetitive effect, plaintiffs only need
to establish concerted action that falls within those recognized catego-
ries. 54 The per se rule ultimately created an irrebuttable presumption
of unreasonableness.55 This presumption is useful as an administra-
tive matter: certain actions are defined as "unlawful" and this helps
courts limit the amount of judicial resources devoted to antitrust liti-
gation. Antitrust trials can be cumbersome, so these administrative
concerns are important. 56
The "rule of reason" analysis considers numerous factors: the total-
ity of the circumstances, balancing the procompetitive and anticompe-
titive implications of the situation in that industry, and the business
47. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
48. GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 6, at 583.
49. See GAVIL, KoVACIC & BAKER, supra note 6, at 185-87, 201-02, for a discussion of the
"quick look" test. But see Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999) (indicating that the
Court limited the test).
50. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282-83 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd 175
U.S. 211 (1899).
51. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
52. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 290 (1985)
("This Court has long held that certain concerted refusals to deal or group boycotts are so likely
to restrict competition without any offsetting efficiency gains that they should be condemned as
per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act.").
53. United States v. Socony-Vacuum, Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
54. GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 6, at 164.
55. Id.
56. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, at 77-78.
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justification of the parties.57 The Supreme Court emphasized its "rule
of reason" analysis in Board of Trade of Chicago:
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined
by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To
bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and per-
haps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question
the court must consider the facts peculiar to the business to which
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a
good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or
the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to
interpret facts and to predict consequences.58
The Supreme Court did not use a rule of reason analysis, or give it
much consideration, from 1918 until the 1970s.59 In the 1970s, the
Court started to move away from a heavy reliance on per se rules and
began to move toward the "rule of reason" framework articulated in
Board of Trade of Chicago.60 The courts subsequently called for a
multifactor analysis to prove an unreasonable trade restraint.61 The
plaintiff would have to introduce evidence of likely or actual adverse
competitive effects. 6 2
Ultimately, the Supreme Court made it clear that the rule of reason
and the per se rules represented two different ways to implement the
same standard: "reasonableness." 6 3 Scholars and practitioners can also
interpret the per se rule as an abbreviated way of applying the rule of
reason.64 The Supreme Court thus reframed antitrust rules around
economic concepts: the core issues for antitrust laws are the anticom-
petitive effects that are unlikely to arise without significant market
power and courts should give consideration to the potential of the
conduct to generate efficiencies. 65
57. Brunk, supra note 1, at 157.
58. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
59. GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 6, at 158.
60. Id. at 159.
61. Id. at 164.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. GAVIL, KoVACIC & BAKER, supra note 6, at 164.
65. Id. at 165.
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3. The Use of Monopsony Power Is Inefficient
The courts have limited experience regarding monopsony66 conduct
and it is often necessary for scholars to rely on court precedent in the
context of seller behavior in the market.6 7 When analyzing monopoli-
zation cases under Section 2 of the Antitrust Act, courts often use
economic rationales that are also applicable if the courts analyzed mo-
nopsony cases. 68 Courts only respond to abuses of monopoly power,
and the law for monopsonies is no different: a buyer does not abuse its
market power if it attempts to seek a lower price.69 Some federal
courts use a per se standard to determine unlawful buyer conduct.7 0
Alternatively, some courts have adopted a consumer welfare standard
and focused on the impact on consumers.7 1 Other courts apply the
full rule of reason analysis, giving the defendant the burden to prove
that the agreement benefited consumers.72 A recent federal court de-
cision indicated that the courts adjudicate potentially anticompetitive
buyer conduct in similar ways to strictly seller conduct: essentially,
courts resolve monopsony cases similar to monopoly cases.73
Buyers have often refused to deal with certain sellers to limit com-
petition and to gain advantages over competitors. The courts have
sometimes characterized these cases as monopoly cases even though
buyers committed the alleged conduct. In U.S. v. Griffith, the owners
of a chain of movie theaters purchased exhibition rights from movie
66. In a monopsony, a single buyer purchases goods and services from multiple sellers. Thus,
the buyer is able to dictate the terms to achieve advantages. See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note
27, at 36-42.
67. Id. at 62.
68. Id. at 63.
69. Id. at 64.
70. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235 (1948)
(indicating that collusive monopolies are illegal even if the defendant did not harm consumers);
Allan Devlin & Bruno Peixoto, Reformulating Antitrust Rules to Safeguard Societal Wealth, 13
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 225, 240-41 (2008) (citing Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc.,
888 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mass. 1995); Kamine/Besicorp Allegany L.P. v. Rochester Gas & Elec.
Corp., 908 F. Supp. 1194, 1203 (W.D.N.Y. 1995)).
71. Richard Scheelings & Joshua D. Wright, "Sui Generis": An Antitrust Analysis of Buyer
Power in the United States and European Union, 39 AKRON L. REV. 207, 225 (2006). See also
Devlin & Peixoto, supra note 70, at 241 (citing Telecor Commc'ns, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 305
F.3d 1124, 1133-36 (10th Cir. 2002); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1061 (D.C. Cir.
1995)).
72. Laura Alexander, Monopsony and the Consumer Harm Standard, 95 GEO. L.J. 1611, 1626
(2007).
73. Natalie Rosenfelt, The Verdict on Monopsony, 20 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 402, 403-05
(2008); Devlin & Peixoto, supra note 70, at 241. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons
Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 325 (2007) (indicating that courts should apply the same
standard in predatory buying and pricing cases).
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distributors.74 In some towns, the owners were the only buyers of
those rights because the towns did not contain other movie theaters.75
In other towns, the owners faced competition from other theaters.76
The owners in Griffith conditioned their purchases of the exhibition
rights on the distributors' agreement that the distributors would give
the owners exclusive rights in every market.77 The owners essentially
used their monopsony power in some markets to enhance their mo-
nopoly power in all markets. While the Supreme Court did not note
the monpsony element, the Court did find that the practice violated
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.78
The Supreme Court has condemned monopsony power when a
buyer used it to eliminate other competitors. In Klor's v. Broadway-
Hale, an owner of a chain of department stores used its buying power
to convince appliance manufacturers not to sell products to a compet-
ing retailer.79 The Court indicated that the practice was illegal per se
and held that the group boycott violated the Sherman Act.80 The case
is unique because the buyer did not try to dictate a lower price but
instead attempted to limit competition.81
C. U.S. Military Hegemony Is Necessary to Foster Global Peace
It is critical that limits on competition do not harm the U.S. military.
American hegemony82 is critical to foster global peace and security for
several reasons.83 The United States military is the dominant power
74. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 102-03 (1948).
75. Id. at 102.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 103-04.
78. Id. at 107-09.
79. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1959).
80. Id.
81. BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 27, at 79.
82. See generally Randolph B. Persaud, Shades of American Hegemony: The Primitive, the
Enlightened, and the Benevolent, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 263, 263 (2004) (indicating that the term
"hegemony" refers to "dominance" and that international relations scholars use the terms "he-
gemony," "power," and "strength" interchangeably).
83. See generally ZBIGNIEw BRZEZINSKI, STRATEGIC VIsION: AMERICA AND THE CRISIS OF
GLOBAL POWER 1, 75, 90-120, 157 (2012); ROBERT KAGAN, THE WORLD AMERICA MADE 8, 30,
40, 66, 70, 75, 86, 89, 99 (2012) [hereinafter KAGAN I]; Josef Joffe, The Default Power: The False
Prophecy of America's Decline, 88 FOREIGN AFF. 21 (2009); Robert Kagan, End of Dreams,
Return of History, 144 HOOVER INST. POL'Y REV. (2007), available at http://www.hoover.org/
publications/policy-review/article/6136 [hereinafter Kagan II]; Stephen M. Walt, American Pri-
macy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls, 55 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 9 (2002), available at http://belfercenter.
ksg.harvard.edu/files/american-primacy-prospects-pitfalls.pdf; Peter Brookes, Why the World
Still Needs America's Military Might, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (2008), available at http://www.
heritage.org/research/lecture/why-the-world-still-needs-americas-military-might; Niall Ferguson,
A World Without Power, FOREIGN PoL'Y (2004), available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
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internationally: foreign nations are unable to compete with U.S. mili-
tary strength.84 American military power can be a stabilizing force to
reduce the risk of regional conflicts between nations: India and Paki-
stan;85 China and Taiwan;86 Russia and other European nations;87 and
Israel and other Middle Eastern countries.88 A reduction in American
influence could intensify the risk of regional conflicts as the regional
powers attempt to gain superiority. 89 The exercise of U.S. leadership
can also be influential in other areas as nations become more recep-
tive to American values. 90 If America exercises its leadership, nations
are more likely to cooperate on critical issues: free trade markets, 91
global warming and environmental issues,92 the spread of democ-
racy,93 and human rights.94 Cooperation amongst nations can also be
critical to limit nuclear proliferation to rogue states95 or to reduce the
risks of international terrorism. 96 Ultimately, U.S. hegemony is neces-
sary to preclude global war between nations possessing nuclear weap-
onry while also fostering international cooperation in important
areas. 97
If America's military strength became inadequate, a global rival to
the U.S. could emerge or the U.S. might be unable to fulfill military
strategies. 98 The best way for America to maintain its military superi-
ority is prioritize the innovation and research of new technology. 99
The superiority of America's military is currently due to the quality of
articles/2004/07/01/aworldwithout-power; Bradley Thayer, In Defense of Primacy, THE NAT'L
INTEREST (2006); Khalilzad, supra note 10.
84. Kagan II, supra note 83.
85. BRZEZINSKI, supra note 83, at 85; Joffe, supra note 83, at 35; Khalilzad, supra note 10;
Thayer, supra note 83.
86. BRZEZINSKI, supra note 83, at 91-92; KAGAN 1, supra note 83, at 86-89; Kagan II, supra
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America's weapons, as the U.S. currently possesses weapons that
other nations do not.100 During the middle of the twentieth century,
advancements in science became critical to advance American hegem-
ony because they led to a more sophisticated military arsenal. 10' A
decline in innovation or product quality in America's military arsenal
could lead to decrease in U.S. hegemony, ultimately creating an unsta-
ble global environment.102
D. The History and Structure Military Weapons Procurement
1. The Military Procurement Process Is Inefficient
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn criticized the current
state of defense acquisition by stating, "[A]cquisition reform is not an
option, it is an imperative." 103 A buyer in the private sector could
purchase some of the same goods as the government in one third of
the time and for one third of the price.104 One extreme example of
excessive government regulation is the specifications for the fruitcake:
the government's requirements exceed eighteen pages.105 The De-
fense Department's procurement process is also inefficient. The
House Armed Services Committee's report in the 2007 Fiscal year
stated, "[T]he Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition process is
broken."106 According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO), the final cost for research and development projects was
forty-two percent higher than the Defense Department initially esti-
mated.107 Since 1990, the GAO has continuously indicated that the
Defense Department's weapon acquisitions program is inefficient and
needs reform. 08
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Nominations: Hearing before the S. Armed Serv. Comm., 111th Cong. 10, 12 (2009) (state-
ment of William Lynn, Deputy Sec'y of Def.) [hereinafter Hearing].
104. Christopher F. Corr & Kristina Zissis, Convergence and Opportunity: The WTO Govern-
ment Procurement Agreement and U.S. Procurement Reform, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
303, 314 (1999).
105. Id.
106. MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34026, DEFENSE AcQuISITIONS: How
DOD ACQUIRES WEAPON SYSTEMS AND RECENT EFFORTS To REFORM THE PROCESS 1 (2010)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 109-452, at 350 (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/
RL34026.pdf).
107. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILrrY OFFICE, GAO-09-326SP, DEFENSE AcQuISITIONS: ASSESS-
MENTS OF SELECTED PROGRAMS 1 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/287947.pdf
[hereinafter GAO: DEFENSE AcouIsITIONS].
108. SCHWARTZ, supra note 106, at 16.
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For products that the Defense Department acquired in 2008, it took
the Department twenty-two months longer to start using those goods
than the Department initially estimated.109 From 2005 to 2009, the
Department spent thirty-one percent of its budget on contracts that
defense firms acquired through noncompetitive means.110 Given the
current trends, Deputy Secretary Lynn has stated that it will be diffi-
cult for the U.S. to sustain a large enough military force to meet its
current military demands. 1'
2. Several Pieces of Legislation Govern Military Procurement
Several statutes and pieces of legislation are critical to the analysis
of the intersection of military policies and antitrust laws. The Armed
Services Procurement Act authorizes the Defense Department, the
military services, NASA, and the Coast Guard to acquire goods and
services.112 Executive agencies have implemented the Federal Acqui-
sition Regulations (FAR).113 The FAR is a body of rules that govern
acquisitions made by governmental agencies.114 The Defense Depart-
ment has implemented the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations
(DFAR) to govern its procurement practices."15 The DFARs also in-
corporate incentives for small businesses.116 The Competition in Con-
tracting Act (CICA) mandates that the government use competitive
procedures when selecting goods and services.117 CICA's goal is to
ensure that the government purchases products efficiently. 18 The
Berry Amendment1 9 and the Buy American Actl20 prioritize securing
goods from domestic sources. The military can also classify research
and technology for the sake of national security under Executive Or-
der 12958.121
109. GAO: DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS, supra note 107, at 2.
110. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-833, FEDERAL CONTRACTING: OPPOR-
TUNITIEs ExIST To INCREASE COMPETITION AND ASSESS REASONS WHEN ONLY ONE OFFER IS
RECEIVED 2 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10833.pdf.
111. Hearing, supra note 103, at 61.
112. Corr & Zissis, supra note 104, at 308.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. SCHWARTZ, supra note 106, at 2.
116. DFARs 219.502 (2009), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfars/html/current/
219_5.htm.
117. Corr & Zissis, supra note 104, at 309.
118. Id.
119. 10 U.S.C. § 2533(a) (2006).
120. 41 U.S.C. § 8302 (Supp. 2011).
121. Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995).
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Government agencies award contracts using one of two procedures:
(1) sealed bidding or (2) competitive negotiation. 122 When using the
sealed bidding procedure, the government issues written solicitation
to private contractors, and those contractors then submit bids to the
government.123 Alternatively, in competitive negotiations, the gov-
ernment gives detailed "requests for proposals."124 The government
will accept the best offer the contractors provide.125
3. The Government Is the Sole Buyer When Making
Defense Acquisitions
Part of the complexity of the acquisition process is inherent in the
market forces that underlie the defense industry. The coffee shop ex-
ample represents the antithesis of defense acquisition. A customer
buying coffee might have several options: she could go to the location
near her office; she could chose to go to a coffee shop farther away
but with a less expensive product; she could bring coffee from home;
or she could forgo coffee and sleep more. The coffee shop can also
rely on certain market forces: it has a standard product; it has a gen-
eral idea about the budget and the amount of coffee it should make;
the price is determined by competition between shops; it is easy for
new shops to enter the market; the transaction between the buyer and
the shop is simple; and the buyers and sellers have near perfect mar-
ket information.
A completely different relationship exists in defense acquisitions.
While a coffee shop enjoys numerous customers, the U.S. government
is the only purchaser.126 Essentially, the defense industry represents a
monopsony because there is only one buyer for the numerous sell-
ers.127 The military is more akin to a coffee shop that dominates the
coffee market, and is essentially the only buyer of coffee beans. De-
fense firms compete at the design stage, and the government is more
interested in quality than price.128 The price is also a multi-step and
often multi-year process between the government and the defense
122. Corr & Zissis, supra note 104, at 309.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Mark V. Arena & John Birkler, Determining When Competition is a Reasonable Strategy
for the Production Phase of Defense Acquisition, in FROM MARGINAL ADJUSTMENTS TO MEAN-
INGFUL CHANGE: RETHINKING WEAPON SYSTEM ACQUISITION 4-5 (2010), available at http://
www.rand.org/content/damlrand/pubs/monographs/2010/RANDMG1020.pdf.
127. SAPOLSKY, GHOLZ & TALMADGE, supra note 3, at 75.
128. Arena & Birkier, supra note 126, at 2-3.
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firms and their subcontractors. 1 2 9 Defense firms additionally encoun-
ter numerous uncertainties in the acquisition process: they might dis-
cover problems with the products they are creating; they might
incorrectly estimate how long it will take to build a new product or
how expensive the project will be; and the firms or the Defense De-
partment might discover additional problems during the product test-
ing.130 These factors mean that the price can change even after the
negotiation stage. Unlike other markets, the government has unparal-
leled power: the contractors work with very few customers and have
to meet government demands, as it is illegal to sell weapons to other
sources.13
All military branches now purchase weapons together as one unit,
while historically the branches purchased weapons separately.132 The
weapons centralization process exacerbates the negative impacts of
monopsony power and decreases competition and product quality.133
When military branches purchase weapons together, the seller is un-
likely to deviate from the preference of the one buyer, and this de-
creases project creativity.134
Aircraft technology exemplifies the advantages of inter-military
competition. When the military branches bought aircraft separately,
the branches competed with one another to guarantee the better
product, and each branch was creative in its technology specifica-
tions. 35 The competition led to the Air Force purchasing the A-10
ground attack aircraft, which aviation historians consider the best air-
craft to have flown close air support missions. 136 Another example of
the benefits of inter-military competition is in the context of nuclear
weaponry. Out of concern that the Air Force would dominate
America's nuclear forces during the Cold War, the Navy purchased
the Polaris submarine-based ballistic missile.' 37 The Polaris made
America's second-strike nuclear deterrent more efficient and cost
effective.s38
129. Id. at 7.
130. Id. at 5.
131. SAPOLSKY, GHOLZ & TALMADGE, supra note 3, at 75.
132. Id. at 76 (indicating that the modern Joint Striker Fighter and the TFX of the 1960s are
projects in which the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force attempted to purchase the same ver-
sion of the equipment).
133. Id. at 76.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 77.
136. SAPOLSKY, GHOLZ & TALMADGE, supra note 3, at 77.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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4. The History and Evolution of Defense Procurement
The process of defense acquisition is cumbersome and has evolved
throughout American history. During the Revolutionary War, the
Continental Army purchased goods and services from contractors. 39
The contractors provided transportation, clothing, engineering ser-
vices, labor, and weapons for the Army.140 The Continental Congress
established a procurement system to aid the Continental Army.141
The Congress appointed both a Commissary General and a Quarter-
master General to purchase goods and services for the army.142 The
process has changed substantially over time to meet the needs of the
current military.143
The broad phrase "defense acquisition" applies to more than just
the purchase of a good. 144 The acquisition process includes numerous
stages: the Defense Department must specify the design of a product;
the contractors must engineer and construct the product; the Depart-
ment and the contractors must test the new project; the military then
deploys the new product; and the military must dispose of the obso-
lete weapons.145
It is also difficult for the military to acquire funding for a new prod-
uct. 146 Four congressional committees must separately agree to fund
any new project.147 The Department additionally experiences a high
degree of turnover within its leadership positions.148 The juxtaposi-
tion of congressional approval and new Defense Department leader-
ship can make it difficult for Congress and the Department to agree
on funding for new projects.149 Without the same leadership in the
military, Congress often cuts the projects when it experiences a budget
crisis.150
The Defense Department and Congress use a three-step process to
develop weapons.' 5' The military creates each weapon to meet a cer-
tain requirement, the federal budget pays for each weapon, and the
139. SCHWARTZ, supra note 106, at 1-2.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. SCHWARTZ, supra note 106, at 1.
145. Id.
146. Arena & Birkler, supra note 126, at 8.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. SCHWARTZ, supra note 106, at 3.
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Department allocates the weapon to a specific part of the military. 15 2
The Department uses the Joint Capabilities Integration and Develop-
ment System to identify which capabilities the military needs for its
future missions.153 The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Exe-
cution System develop the Department's budget for all of its acquisi-
tions.154 The Defense Acquisition System manages each acquisition
to maximize U.S. national security.s55
Acquisition reform is not a novel concept, and it is something that
the federal government has focused on for over a century.156 Con-
gress and the Executive Branch have consistently been frustrated with
the levels of mismanagement in defense acquisitions.1 57 Even during
the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln requested the resignation
of Simon Cameron, the Secretary of War, because of his mismanage-
ment.158 That year, the House Committee on Contracts published a
1,100-page report documenting misdeeds that resulted in the govern-
ment purchasing diseased horses, rotten food, and weapons that did
not work.159
III. MILITARY PROCUREMENT POLICIES ARE INEFFICIENT
A. Barriers to Entry Make Acquisition Reform Problematic
While competition would help the U.S. defense industry reduce
costs and maintain global military superiority, there are occasions
when competition is not helpful and the military would be wise to
forgo it.160 Specifically, the acquisition of major systems involving
large nonrecurring costs dictates that the Department focus on a sin-
gle supplier. 161 For example, the military might purchase an expensive
vehicle from one source. The initial cost will be high but the military
will not have continuous costs. So the Department purchases the ve-
hicle just from one supplier. An increase in competition between de-
fense firms would require the Department to allocate additional
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 4.
155. Id. at 7.
156. SCHWARTZ, supra note 106, at 13.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. (citing Government Contracts: The Fraud of the Contractors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1862,
at 2).
160. Arena & Birkier, supra note 126, at 1.
161. Id. at 1-2.
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resources to manage the additional products that the firms would
offer. 162
From a practical standpoint, the Defense Department might en-
counter difficulty fostering greater competition, as new defense firms
would face high entry barriers. In the defense acquisition industry,
weapon producers must have an enormous amount of monetary re-
sources at the research and pre-production stages. 63 New companies
would also lack the requisite manufacturing experience necessary to
produce products for the military.164 Also, as additional firms pro-
duce more goods, the Defense Department will require additional
testing of those goods.165 Additional product testing could result in
delays in the production process.166 The selection process would also
raise a number of questions regarding fairness, otherwise the govern-
ment could open itself up to future litigation.167 The military would
have to allocate more individuals to manage the new defense firms.168
By allocating more upper level management for new products, the
military would increase the production costs while decreasing the
probability of project competition.169
Politics only conflate the problems: any new competitor would have
to persuade four different congressional committees.170 The commit-
tees and the Department often have conflicting views, creating addi-
tional barriers.171 The biggest problem might be that the short-term
costs to competition are clear, while the long-term benefits are not
easy for Congress to determine as they face yearly deficits.172 Exacer-
bating the problem, divergent studies have indicated that acquisition
reform could decrease Defense Department procurement costs by
seventy-nine percent or could increase procurement costs by fourteen
percent.173
162. Id. at 7.
163. Id.
164. Arena & Birkier, supra note 126, at 9.
165. Id. at 8.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 9.
168. Id. at 7.
169. Arena & Birkier, supra note 126, at 7.
170. Id. at 8.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 9.
173. Id. at 9-10.
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B. The Current Structure Is Anticompetitive, Harming
American Hegemony
There are numerous disadvantages and consequences to current
military policies. There are issues with protectionism and the promo-
tion of certain types of businesses at the expense of product quality
and efficient costs. Both the Berry Amendment 74 and the Buy
American Act175 seek to promote American corporations at the ex-
pense of potentially more efficient foreign firms. The Defense De-
partment sets aside procurement contracts for small businesses to
promote those companies.176 The military also has advantages with
critical research in the private sector: it has the ability to classify re-
search' 77 or it can privilege information in court documents and pre-
vent the release of that information to the public. 178 These policies
create disincentives for businesses to innovate while keeping valuable
information from consumers.179
1. Protectionism Is Rife in Military Procurement
Congress and the Defense Department limit foreign firms from cre-
ating military products to minimize the risk to national security. 80
Companies that are subject to foreign ownership face hardships in ac-
quiring security clearances.18 The impact is simple: a security clear-
ance is essential for a defense industry supplier and makes Defense
Department acquisitions impossible from foreign sources.182 A com-
pany without a clearance is unable to work with the U.S. Defense De-
partment. Two pieces of legislation exist that can also limit a
company's access: the Defense Industrial Security Program and the
National Security Act of 1947.183 The National Security Act autho-
174. 10 U.S.C. § 2533(a) (2006).
175. 41 U.S.C. § 8302 (Supp. 2011).
176. DFARs, supra note 116, at 219.502.
177. KEVIN KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-771, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION POLICY AND
PROCEDURE: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED 5 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/
97-771.pdf.
178. David H. Isaacs & Robert M. Farle, Privilege-Wise and Patent (and Trade Secret) Foolish:
How the Courts' Misapplication of the Military and State Secrets Privilege Violates the Constitu-
tion and Endangers National Security, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785, 786 (2009).
179. Id.
180. Christopher F. Corr, A Survey of United States Controls on Foreign Investment and Oper-
ations: How Much is Enough?, 9 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 417, 436-37 (1994).
181. Id. at 437.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 437-38.
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rizes the Defense Department to restrict access to classified informa-
tion to private corporations.18 4
The sheer size of the international market of weapons sellers would
give the U.S. many new procurement possibilities. The world military
procurement market represented nearly $5.5 trillion in 1998 while the
U.S. federal procurement market alone accounted for approximately
$400 billion in 2007.185 By purchasing goods from foreign corpora-
tions, America could benefit not only from increased competition and
better products but the harm to the domestic economy would be tem-
pered. Nations often make reciprocal agreements to open markets; so
if the U.S. de-emphasized its domestic procurement, other nations
would be more willing to give procurement contracts to U.S. firms.186
Historical studies have found a welfare loss for nations that have high
barriers for the international procurement process.' 87
a. The Buy American Act Decreases Competition for Government
Procurement
The Buy American Act applies to procurement by the Federal Gov-
ernment in general and is not limited to the Defense Department.188
Under the Act, when American products are half of the project's total
cost, U.S. government entities must prioritize working with domestic
firms.189 There are three exceptions to the Act: (1) if the restrictions
are "inconsistent with the public interest," (2) the cost is "unreasona-
ble," or (3) the end products or components are not reasonably availa-
ble at sufficient quality and quantity from a domestic source. 190 To
waive the Act, the President or a federal agency would have to deter-
mine that a waiver is necessary for national security, to avoid a mo-
nopoly, or to ensure a sufficient amount of qualified bidders to allow
for a competitive price. 191 International trade agreements also pro-
vide three more exceptions to the Act: (1) products from Caribbean
Basin Economic Recovery Act Countries, (2) products from Mexico
and Canada pursuant to NAFTA, and (3) end products from Israel.192
The National Defense Authorization Act amended the Act and re-
184. Id.
185. Christopher R. Yukins & Steven L. Schooner, Incrementalism: Eroding the Impediments
to a Global Public Procurement Market, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 529, 533 (2007).
186. Id. at 534.
187. Id. at 533.
188. Corr, supra note at 180, at 441.
189. Id. at 441-42.
190. Corr & Zissis, supra note 104, at 321.
191. Id. at 323.
192. Id. at 325-26.
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quired the Defense Secretary to submit a report to Congress that indi-
cates the total cost of Defense Department purchases from other
nations.193
The Act impacts not only the military but also foreign investors. 194
An international corporation might be deterred from establishing or
purchasing an American assembly facility because the final product
would no longer come from a U.S. company.195 Before contracting
with the federal government, a company must certify that it complied
with the Act and the federal government will penalize false certifica-
tions by suspending the contractors for up to three years and imposing
civil penalties. 196
b. The Berry Amendment Limits Defense Procurement
Congress and the Defense Department have attempted to protect
American industries, especially the defense industrial base.197 Thus,
the two have attempted to limit foreign procurement through "domes-
tic source restrictions."' 98 Representative Elias Berry introduced two
bills to amend the Buy America Act and Congress subsequently
named the amendment the Berry Amendment. 199 The purpose of the
Amendment was to ensure that U.S. firms produced military uniforms
and clothing.200 Congress subsequently added other products to the
Amendment to protect American businesses.201 In 2001, the National
Defense Authorization Act codified and modified the Berry Amend-
ment.2 0 2 The Act gives the Secretary of Defense the authority to
waive the requirements to buy domestically but only under certain
conditions. 203 The Amendment essentially prohibits the Defense De-
partment from purchasing numerous goods and services from foreign
sources: clothing, specialty metals, stainless steel, hand or measuring
tools, clothing fabrics, and food.204 The main difference between this
and the Buy American Act is that the Berry Amendment governs De-
193. VALERIE GRASSO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31236, THE BERRY AMENDMENT: RE-
QUIRING DEFENSE PROCUREMENT TO COME FROM DOMESTIC SOURCES 2 (2009), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natseclRL31236.pdf.
194. Corr, supra note at 180, at 442.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 443.
197. GRASSO, supra note 193, at 3.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 5.
201. Id.
202. GRASSO, supra note 193, at 6.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 3.
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fense Department procurement only while the Buy American Act is
broader and encompasses the entire federal government. 205
The Berry Amendment grants several potential advantages to the
U.S. economy and the U.S. military. First, it might be necessary for
the Defense Department to purchase certain clothing and metals from
domestic sources.206 Dependency on foreign sources could be danger-
ous if the U.S. is engaged in war with foreign sources because the
other nation might cut off the supply for a critical component for U.S.
technology. 207 It would also be possible for another nation to engage
in chemical warfare and damage American products.208 The Amend-
ment also represents an economic lifeline to distressed small Ameri-
can firms that produce certain metals covered by the Amendment.209
Relying only on domestic sources, however, has numerous disad-
vantages, including additional costs and inefficient results. The
Amendment creates a disincentive for American firms to modernize
their products because the firms do not have to compete with interna-
tional firms. 210 This essentially means that the U.S. government pays
a higher price for a low quality product. If the goal of the Defense
Department's procurement process is to maximize product quality for
purposes of U.S. national security, then the Berry Amendment runs
afoul of those goals. The military should make case-by-case determi-
nations to weigh the economic benefits versus the security risks. If the
military deems it necessary for the promotion of U.S. national security
to purchase a beret from China because of lower production costs and
non-existent risks of chemical warfare, then concerns over American
businesses should not prevent lower costs. If military leaders, how-
ever, fear that purchasing berets from China poses a risk to national
security, it should not make those purchases. The military leaders,
however, should have the ability to make that determination.
The Amendment has the ability to permeate every corner of the
defense industry, from technology to foreign policy.211 Technology
plays a vital role in most industries, and the Defense Department is no
different.212 The Department uses specialty metals in most of its
equipment, from aircraft to computers. 213 Domestic sources, how-
205. Id. at 9.
206. Id. at 7.
207. GRASSO, supra note 193, at 7.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 11.
210. Id. at 12.
211. Yukins & Schooner, supra note 185, at 537.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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ever, do not always produce the metals necessary for the equip-
ment.214 Sophisticated and advanced weapons systems are critical to
military supremacy and these technological devices often use titanium
and certain alloys that are less expensive internationally.215 Defense
agencies need to aggressively rely on foreign suppliers as the global
procurement market continues to expand.216 The Under Secretary of
Defense indicated that the Amendment fosters large delays in the
procurement process, "seriously impact[ing] [America's] ability [to]
meet military needs." 217 Shay Assad, the Director of Defense Pro-
curement and Acquisition Policy, indicated that compliance with the
Amendment leads to higher military costs because it is difficult to
trace the supply chains completely to ensure that metals from other
nations do not reach the U.S. military.218
The Amendment additionally has the potential to negatively impact
American foreign policy and create animosity between the U.S. and
other nations. The Bush Administration fought against the barriers to
procurement because the policy negatively impacts military strategy
by making it harder for the U.S. to engage other leaders.219 It reflects
poorly on America when Congress prohibits the Department from
purchasing goods with potential allies. 220 Allies can easily miscon-
strue these policies as a sign of American mistrust.
Congress did make some changes to the Amendment in 2006 to al-
low the military more flexibility. 2 2 1 The Defense Department now has
the authority to waive the metals ban if the domestic market cannot
meet the military's demand.22 2 Congress also exempted smaller
procurements from the metals ban.2 2 3 Additionally, Congress allowed
exemptions for specialty metals incorporated into defense items from
certain nations.224 Thus, the Amendment essentially only prohibits in-
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Yukins & Schooner, supra note 185, at 540.
217. Id. at 538-39 (quoting Memorandum from U.S. Under Sec'y of Def. Kenneth J. Krieg
(June 1, 2006)).
218. Yukins & Schooner, supra note 185, at 539 (quoting Memorandum from Shay D. Assad,
Def. Procurement and Acquisition Policy to Commander, U.S. Special Operations (Sept. 21,
2006), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/2006-1788-DPAP.pdf).
219. Yukins & Schooner, supra note 185, at 540.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 540-41.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Yukins & Schooner, supra note 185, at 541.
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ternational trade in the metals themselves: the Defense Department is
allowed to purchase technology that includes foreign metals.225
The changes, however, are not sufficient to protect national secur-
ity. Congress created political hurdles if the military seeks an exemp-
tion: a board, consisting of members of Congress, must assess the
military's concerns and authorize any exceptions. 226 The changes still
allow for much ambiguity and confusion.227 Congress attempted to
only ban foreign metals in end products, the first-tier parts that end
products directly incorporate, and second-tier components used di-
rectly by the first-tier parts.228 For example, if the end product would
be an aircraft, then the first-tier component could be an engine, and
the second-tier components could be parts used to power the engine.
This results in a problem defining and determining in which tier a cer-
tain part falls.229 This confusion results in higher costs while also
bringing inefficient results for military planners.230 However, there is
one hidden advantage of this new structure: the tier system gives the
Defense Department greater latitude in its interpretation of the Berry
Amendment while also making congressional enforcement much
harder.231 The Amendment ultimately serves minimal purpose: either
it increases military costs while decreasing weapon quality or the De-
fense Department can easily sidestep it.232
c. The Buy American Act and the Berry Amendment Create
An Inefficient Monopsony
Congress should employ the economic rationale embedded in the
Sherman Act to rethink the Buy American Act and the Berry
Amendment with respect to military procurement. Courts have found
bid-rigging, horizontal agreements to fix prices, and collusive bidding
to be illegal per se.233 In this case, Congress should apply a rule of
reason test because the government's conduct does not fall within one
of the three categories. When applying rule of reason analysis, courts
consider numerous factors, including the justifications for the govern-
ment's conduct.234
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 543.
229. Yukins & Schooner, supra note 185, at 544.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 6, at 164.
234. Brunk, supra note 1, at 157.
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Both the Act and the Amendment have positive benefits. If the
military purchases products from foreign firms, the firms could harm
U.S. national security: foreign companies could sabotage American
products or refuse to sell products during times of war. American
firms could also benefit from Defense Department contracts. Some
U.S. small businesses rely on sales from specialty metals for economic
profits. 235
The anticompetitive results of the Act and the Amendment out-
weigh the justifications. Part of Congress's intent for the restrictions
was to prevent foreign firms from competing with domestic firms.
Congress could find that this rationale is inconsistent with the socially
beneficial rationale behind the Sherman Act.236 The monopsony case
law is inconsistent with the military's actions. The Defense Depart-
ment exercises its market power to dictate the terms with defense
firms. The military's conduct resembles the conduct in Klor's. 2 3 7 In
that case, the owner of a chain of department stores used its market
power to force appliance manufacturers not to sell products to a com-
peting retailer. 238 Similarly, Congress uses the government's buying
power to restrict competition amongst defense firms by refusing to
purchase items from foreign companies.
When evaluating monopsonies, courts often determine how the
buyer's use of market power affects consumers.239 In the context of
military procurement, American taxpayers should be the consumers.
The government enacted the restrictions to promote American firms
and to increase national security. Due to the restrictions, however,
the military might award a contract to an inefficient domestic firm that
produces a worse product than a foreign firm. If the Defense Depart-
ment purchased products from foreign sources, other nations might
increase their purchases from U.S. firms.240 The government's limita-
tions on foreign products also increase animosity with foreign leaders,
potentially harming America's national security.241 The Defense De-
partment should have the option of purchasing products from foreign
firms when it feels the risk to national security is minimal. Thus, Con-
gress should determine that the Buy American Act and the Berry
Amendment violate the logic of American antitrust laws.
235. GRAsso, supra note 193, at 7-8.
236. GAVIL, KoVACIC & BAKER, supra note 6, at 89.
237. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1959).
238. Id.
239. Alexander, supra note 72, at 1626-27.
240. Yukins & Schooner, supra note 185, at 534.
241. Id. at 540.
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2. Congress Passed Legislation to Promote Small Businesses
The Federal Acquisition Regulation 242 implements both the Small
Business Act 2 4 3 and the Federal Property and Administrative Services
Act.2 4 4 Both Acts recommend that the Government assist small busi-
nesses by providing the businesses a portion of the Government's to-
tal procurement contracts. 245 The Defense Department's regulations
have created set-asides for small businesses in three categories: (1)
construction, maintenance, and repairs under $2.5 million; (2) dredg-
ing246 under $1.5 million; and (3) architect and engineer services for
family housing or military construction projects under $300,000.247
The regulations create incentives for small businesses while discourag-
ing larger corporations from bidding on smaller projects. 248
Small businesses represent a large component of the U.S. economy
and provide economic and non-economic assets. Small businesses
have created between sixty and eighty percent of all new jobs in the
last decade while employing more than half of all private sector em-
ployees.249 Overall, this workforce produces over fifty percent of
America's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 250 The businesses pro-
duce certain non-economic benefits as well: a higher quality of life,
employment opportunities for individuals, and an opportunity for in-
dividuals to pursue their interests. 251 Small businesses can serve a crit-
ical function in the U.S. marketplace.
Competitive advantages for inefficient sellers negatively impact the
military and U.S. national security interests. Icono provides an exam-
ple of a situation in which the government favored the inefficient
firm.252 Two corporations, Icono and Jensen, submitted bids to build
barricades in Central lowa.253 Jensen received an offer from the
Army and performed the contract because it submitted the lowest bid,
242. FAR Part 19, available at https://www.acquisition.gov/far/90-37/html/19.html.
243. 15 U.S.C. § 631 (2006).
244. 41 U.S.C. § 252(b) (2006).
245. 15 U.S.C. § 631, 41 U.S.C. § 252(b) (2006).
246. Moving sediments from one water area to another to ensure that the ships can navigate
the water.
247. DFARs, supra note 116, at 219.502-2 (2009).
248. Kara L. Haberbush, Limiting the Government's Exposure to Bid Rigging Schemes: A
Critical Look at the Sealed Bidding Regime, 30 PuB. CONT. L.J. 97, 104 (2001).
249. Smith, supra note 35, at 176.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Ofer Grosskopf, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment: Protection of Competition Rules Via
the Law of Restitution, 79 TEx. L. REV. 1981, 2015 (2001) (citing Iconco v. Jensen Constr. Co.,
622 F.2d 1291, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1980)).
253. Icono, 622 F.2d at 1293-94.
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while Icono submitted the second lowest bid.2 5 4 Icono later discov-
ered that Jensen should not have qualified as a small business and thus
the Army should not have awarded it the contract. 255
The military often precludes large and efficient corporations from
submitting bids for defense contracts.256 The government has a noble
goal of supporting small businesses, but the government should not
sacrifice cost or product quality. Icono exemplifies this point: the
Army awarded a defense contract to the lowest bidder without sacri-
ficing product quality.257 Yet, the regulations indicate the Army
should not have awarded that contract. While the price differential of
any individual project might be low, the costs can add up over time.
Preferring a small business while excluding more efficient larger firms
can ultimately increase military costs in an industry already rife with
inefficiencies.
a. Preferential Treatment of Small Businesses Is Inefficient
The antitrust analysis for small business exceptions is similar to the
analysis of domestic source restrictions. Congress again should find
that the exceptions violate the logic of antitrust laws and rule of rea-
son analysis. In the context of antitrust analysis, courts would proba-
bly apply a rule of reason analysis when considering the justifications
for the exceptions. 258 Small businesses are important to the U.S. for
economic and non-economic reasons: businesses produce jobs while
also increasing employment opportunities for individuals. 259
The rule of reason analysis is harder in this context. Congress's in-
tent in enacting the exceptions was to promote small businesses. This
intent is inconsistent with the rationale of the Sherman Act.260 By
promoting small businesses, the Defense Department is refusing to
deal with larger corporations. This conduct is again akin to the owner
of the chain of department stores in Klor's that forced appliance man-
ufacturers not to sell products to a competing retailer. 261 Congress
should also consider how the military's conduct affects consumers, or
American taxpayers. 262 The Defense Department's policy of prefer-
ring small businesses could increase costs while decreasing product
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Haberbush, supra note 248.
257. Grosskopf, supra note 252.
258. Brunk, supra note 1.
259. Smith, supra note 35.
260. GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 6, at 89.
261. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1959).
262. Alexander, supra note 72 at 1626.
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quality. However, the U.S. does use antitrust laws to promote small
business. 263 In this case, Congress could reasonably find that the eco-
nomic and non-economic benefits to promoting small businesses out-
weigh the disadvantages. The Defense Department only prefers small
businesses for a limited amount of projects and this fact should aid
Congress in its decision. 264
3. The Military Can Limit the Spread of Information to the
Private Sector
Security classification can be boom or bust for America: on one
level, classification of information could be necessary for purposes of
national security but it could also prevent the public from taking ad-
vantage of the information. Security orders have existed since 1869;
however, they assumed a presidential character in 1940 when Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt issued the first presidential security classi-
fication directive. 265 The current policy is in Executive Order 12958,
which President Bill Clinton signed in 1995 and President George W.
Bush amended in 2003.266 The Order authorizes the classification of
information for reasons of "national security," or information for "the
national defense or foreign relations of the United States."267 There
are three levels of classification: Top Secret, Secret, and Confiden-
tial.2 6 8 The order sets a ten-year time limit for any classification. 269
The military and state secret privilege provides the Defense Depart-
ment another avenue to limit information to the public that could en-
danger America's security.270 The privilege developed through
common law and is an evidentiary rule. 271 During the litigation pro-
cess, the government can invoke the privilege to exclude evidence re-
lated to foreign relations and national security.272 Courts have
expanded the privilege to cover patent litigation or circumstances
when inventors alleged that the military, or its contractors, used their
devices without proper authorization. 273 The military often asserts the
privilege to cover documents so that the documents do not enter the
263. GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 6, at 32.
264. DFARs, supra note 116, at 219.502-2 (2009).
265. KOSAR, supra note 177, at 5.
266. Id. at 6-10.
267. Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (1995).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Isaacs & Farle, supra note 178, at 786.
271. Carrie Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope Through Govern-
ment Misuse, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 105 (2007).
272. Isaacs & Farle, supra note 178, at 792-93.
273. Id. at 794.
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public record.274 When using the privilege, the military is usually suc-
cessful because courts generally defer to the Executive Branch and
only require a "reasonable danger" of security implications. 275 The
government's use of the privilege makes litigation difficult for inven-
tors as courts preclude the inventors from using important evidence
during litigation.276
Courts that defer to the military create severe harm to American
national security. Protections for trade secrets and patents are neces-
sary to give inventors proper incentives; without the protections, the
inventors do not have a legal recourse if a third party copies the inven-
tions and sells the product for a lower price.277 Often, these inven-
tions are critical for new military technology and intellectual
property.278 The lack of protection creates a disincentive for smaller
inventors, as these individuals are less likely to have large amounts of
capital. 279 Larger corporations hire lobbyists and former Defense De-
partment employees to help the corporations politically. 280 The lack
of monetary resources prevents the smaller inventors from gaining the
same political clout.281 Traditional defense firms do not have the same
expertise in these technological areas as new inventors. 282 Defense
Department studies have indicated the need to develop new technolo-
gies to aid U.S. national security.283 These inventors are also essential
for the future of national security as they provide a unique service that
traditional suppliers do not: they are able to integrate advanced com-
munications, information technology, and computers into military in-
stitutions.284 While the military provides advantages to small
businesses for certain types of defense contracts, the military disre-
gards small business inventors. All corporations should have equal
access to information: one corporation should not have to face a struc-
tural barrier that another corporation can avoid.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 800 (citing Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 97 (1953))).
276. Isaacs & Farle, supra note 178, at 800.
277. Id. at 806-07.
278. Id. at 807.
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280. Id. at 808-09.
281. Isaacs & Farle, supra note 178, at 808-09.
282. Id. at 808.
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284. Id. at 807.
2012] 433
434 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 10:405
a. Case Study: Nanotechnology
The military's classification of research can have an adverse impact
on consumers. The case study of nanotechnology represents an in-
triguing example of how military classification can negatively impact
American citizens. Nanotechnology is the discipline of building things
from one atom or molecule at a time: a bottom-up approach.285 This
contrasts with traditional technology that builds from the top down:
taking matter and scaling it down to form an object.286 For example, if
a person takes a large tree and then uses a chainsaw to carve a chair,
that person is using a top-down approach. The person removes matter
until achieving the desired outcome. Alternatively, if a person at-
tempts to take individual atoms or molecules and combine them to
make a chair, that person uses a bottom-up approach.
Life evolved through a bottom-up approach: life began from small
molecules or atoms that evolved over time.2 87 Thus, using nano-
technology could revolutionize future technology. The military could
"classify" nanotechnology if it decided that the research regards "na-
tional security." 288 During the nineteenth century, certain technology
was instrumental in giving Western powers unchallenged hegemony
throughout the world: stream navigation, high explosives, and repeat-
ing firearms.289 Nanotechnology could play a similar role in the future
for the U.S. military, giving the military an incentive to classify the
research, at least in the short term.290 Professor Reynolds believes
that the military could use nanotechnology to produce devices that are
difficult to detect or use nanotechnology to modify soldiers' brains
and their cognitive skills. 2 91 The Defense Department potentially
could produce a weapon for psychological warfare: the devices could
manipulate the brains of individuals or populations. 292
Nanotechnology could potentially provide a boost to U.S. national
security. However, the classification process is not necessary and
might cause harm while hampering progress. During the Cold War,
the federal government attempted to limit the spread of sensitive in-
formation, including information about atomic energy, by limiting in-
285. Reynolds, supra note 5, at 193-97.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 182.
288. Id. at 193.
289. Id.
290. Reynolds, supra note 5, at 193.
291. Id. (citing Scott Pace, Military Implications of Nanotechnology, 6 FORESIGHT INST. 2
(Aug. 1, 1989), available at http://www.foresight.org/Updates/UpdateO6/UpdateO6.2.html).
292. Id. at 194.
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ternational data sharing, and requiring pre-publication review. 293
While the U.S. did win the Cold War, scientists in 1980s believed that
the limitations on information and research were overly strict and
caused greater harm than good. 2 9 4 In the context of nanotechnology,
critics fear that classifying the research could hurt consumers econom-
ically. 2 9 5 Even members of the military present doubts about classify-
ing nanotechnology research; Admiral David Jeremiah stated, "the
uninformed policymaker is likely to impose restrictions on develop-
ment of technology in such a way as to inhibit commercial develop-
ment (ultimately beneficial to mankind) while permitting those
operating outside the restrictive bounds to gain an irrevocable
advantage. "296
Policymakers and the Defense Department could decide to classify
nanotechnology to protect U.S. national security, while hurting U.S.
hegemony and consumers. Military nanotechnology is more likely to
be dangerous than civilian versions because civilian counterparts are
generally founded on a much deeper level of experience. 297 This is the
case because in the private sector, peer review leads to greater over-
sight and allows researchers to find more problems than are found
developing the research solely in the vacuum of the military realm.2 9 8
The private sector allows for more testing and more competition to
ensure a viable product. Nanotechnology also could have tremendous
advantages for consumers: it could provide a cure for cancer while
also providing sophisticated technology.299
The relevancy of nanotechnology hardly matters. The main point is
that the military should not preclude the public from receiving the
benefits of the research. While the military has numerous rationales
for classifying the research, the advantages do not outweigh the costs.
National security regulations must protect American citizens. Al-
lowing the open market to have access to this research allows civilians
and the military to receive the benefits of this information. As more
firms have access to this technology, more firms are likely to develop
new cures and new products. This in turn also increases economic
efficiencies. At the same time, the market can still develop technol-
293. Id. at 195-96.
294. Id. at 196.
295. Reynolds, supra note 5, at 196.
296. David E. Jeremiah, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Nanotechnology and Global Security, Presenta-
tion at the Fourth Foresight Inst. Conference on Molecular Nanotechnology (Nov. 9, 1955),
available at http://www.zyvex.com/nanotech/nano4/jeremiahPaper.html.
297. Reynolds, supra note 5, at 196.
298. Id. at 196-97.
299. Id. at 197.
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ogy for military use. While it would be dangerous if the wrong person
developed nanotechnology, it is just as dangerous to deny citizens ac-
cess to a cure for cancer or other socially beneficial products.
b. The Military's Restrictions on Information Are Anticompetitive
Congress will have difficulties conducting antitrust analysis when
the government limits research. Using a rule of reason analysis, Con-
gress should consider the government's justifications for its con-
duct.300 The government's ability to use the military and state secret
privilege and the ability to classify research is potentially necessary to
promote U.S. national security. The Buy American Act, the Berry
Amendment, and the exceptions for small businesses are unique in
that even without those policies, the Defense Department could still
purchase items from domestic firms, or smaller firms if the military
decided to make a purchase for national security reasons. In this con-
text, the military is restricting access to research because of national
security concerns. It is difficult for Congress to indicate otherwise
since the military has greater expertise.
The Defense Department should follow antitrust rationales and use
caution when limiting private sector access to information. Congress
needs to protect inventors to encourage them to develop new techno-
logical products for the military's use. Private sector firms should
have access to certain research; these firms can test and develop prod-
ucts, potentially helping the military. By having access to classified
research, private sector firms could develop new products that benefit
consumers; for example, private firms with access to nanotechnology
research could develop a cure for cancer.301
4. Courts Defer to the Military Too Often in Disputes
Courts conflate the lack of competition in the military procurement
process by deferring to the military in contractual disputes. In claims
against the United States, a federal statute indicates that a court
should give "due regard to the interests of national defense and na-
tional security" in making its final determination. 302 In theory, this is
a good goal: it is important that the Defense Department is able to
300. Brunk, supra note 1, at 157.
301. Reynolds, supra note 5, at 197. See also Jessica K. Fender, Note and Comment, The FDA
and NANO: Big Problems with Tiny Technology, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1063, 1070-72 (2008);
James R. Heath & Mark E. Davis, Nanotechnology and Cancer, 59 ANN. REV. MED. 251 (2008),
available at http://authors.1ibrary.caltech.edu/10368/l/HEAarm8.pdf; Gregory Mandel, Na-
notechnology Governance, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1323, 1333-34 (2008).
302. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(3) (2006).
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procure weapons while entering into and terminating contracts at its
own pace, especially during wartime. A delay in weaponry has the
potential to drastically impact America's ability to engage in war
efficiently.
The problem occurs in practice: the courts' deference to the military
decreases competition, creating disincentives to innovate. 303 Re-
cently, the U.S. has successfully used the national security defense to
engage in anticompetitive behavior: this is partially due to the fact
that America is currently engaged in conflict with several nations. 304
The legal system is the only enforcement mechanism guaranteeing
that federal agencies abide by the pieces of legislation that govern the
procurement process. Giving the Defense Department too much lee-
way can allow agencies to circumvent the rules without facing any
consequences. One recent court even stated, "Accordingly - in this
case and at this time - the court has determined that the interests of
open and fair competition do not outweigh the interests of national
defense and security." 305
303. This issue is exacerbated by the fact that there is very little appellate court precedent.
Prot. Strategies, Inc. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 225, 236 (2007) ("The Federal Circuit has
addressed this provision of the Tucker Act on only one occasion . . . .") (citing PGBA, LLC v.
United States, 389 F.3d 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
304. Surya Gablin Gunasekara, The Balancing Act: Weighing National Security Against Equi-
table Procurement Practices, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 569, 576-77 (2011) (citing Kropps Holding, Inc. v.
United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 537, 538-39, 551-52 (2005); Maden Tech Consulting Inc. v. United
States, 74 Fed. Cl. 786, 790-93 (2006); EOD Tech., Inc. v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 12, 18, 23
(2008)). See also Infrastructure Def. Tech., LLC v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 375, 403 (2008)
("'[T]he interests of national defense' . . . militates against granting the relief sought . . . .")
(quoting § 1491(b)(3)); DataPath v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 162, 166-67 (2009) (placing na-
tional security concerns ahead of concerns for competition); Linc Gov't Servs., LLC v. United
States, 96 Fed. Cl. 672, 702-03 (2010) ("Thus, when military and national security interests are
implicated, the public interest factor gains 'inflated' importance in the court's balancing of the
equities.").
305. DataPath, 87 Fed. Cl. at 166 (emphasis added). To be fair, not all courts have ruled this
way, indicating that courts have applied this statute inconsistently. One court stated,
The Tucker Act requires that the Court consider the interest of national defense in its
bid protest decisions. ... 'The Court will not blindly accede to such claims but is bound
to give them the most careful consideration." While the Court certainly must give seri-
ous consideration to national defense ... allegations involving national security must be
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Gentex Corp. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 634, 655 (2003) (quoting Harris Corp. v. United
States, 628 F. Supp. 813, 822 n.13 (D.D.C. 1986)). See also Afghan Am. Army Servs. Corp. v.
United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 341, 368 (2009) ("The mere fact that national security concerns are
implicated does not create a 'law-free zone' where ordinary applicable legal principles must nec-
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States, 100 Fed. Cl. 687, 721-22 (2011).
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IV. COMPETITION WILL ENSURE AMERICA'S SAFETY
The goal of U.S. antitrust laws is to maximize efficiency and to ben-
efit consumers.30 6 Congress should apply the logic of antitrust laws to
the public sector because the government is responsible for securing
the safety of the nation. The Defense Department should prefer cor-
porations that either increase the quality of their products or decrease
the costs without sacrificing quality. The Department is rife with ex-
pensive and delayed projects, indicating a need for reform.307 If the
military wants to promote small businesses, it is has sufficient avenues
available to it that do not result in a potential decrease in national
security. The government's primary goal in decreasing the pool of
suppliers and limiting research is to enhance U.S. hegemony. Con-
gress and legal scholars need to recognize that those policies can unin-
tentionally run afoul of the government's goals. Congress should
repeal laws that decrease competition and create inefficiencies. Ulti-
mately, Congress needs to apply antitrust logic to the laws impacting
the military, and courts need to decrease their deference to the gov-
ernment. This would lead to lower costs combined with higher prod-
uct quality, benefiting U.S. citizens.
306. GAVIL, KovAcic & BAKER, supra note 6, at 40.
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